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 
Abstract—Vehicular networks are one of the main technologies 
that will be leveraged by the arrival of the future fifth generation 
(5G) mobile cellular networks. While scalability and latency are 
the major drawbacks of IEEE 802.11p and 4G LTE enabled 
vehicular communications, respectively, the 5G technology is a 
promising solution to empower the real-time services offered by 
vehicular networks. However, the security and privacy of such 
services in 5G enabled vehicular networks need to be addressed 
first. In this paper, we propose a novel system model for a 5G 
enabled vehicular network that facilitates a reliable, secure and 
privacy-aware real-time video reporting service. This service is 
designed for the participating vehicles to instantly report the 
videos of traffic accidents to guarantee a timely response from 
official and/or ambulance vehicles toward accidents. While it 
provides strong security and privacy guarantees for the 
participating vehicle’s identity and the video contents, the 
proposed service ensures traceability of misbehaving participants 
through a cooperation scheme among different authorities. We 
show the feasibility and the fulfilment of the proposed reporting 
service in 5G enabled vehicular networks in terms of security, 
privacy and efficiency.  
 
Index Terms—5G Vehicular Networks, Cloud-Assisted, 
Security, Privacy-Aware, Video Reporting. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE future fifth generation (5G) of cellular networks has 
recently attracted a noticeable amount of research interests 
and efforts in the academia and industry worldwide [1-3]. 5G 
is a promising technology that will not be just an increment of 
the current 4G technology, but offers a 1,000 times higher 
mobile data volume per unit area, 10-100 times higher number 
of connecting devices and user data rate, 10 times longer 
battery life, and five times reduced latency [4]. Recently, the 
Cisco Visual Networking Index report shows that monthly 
global mobile data traffic will be 30.6 exabytes by 2020 where 
75% of this traffic will be video data [5]. Therefore, 5G 
cellular networks should be a paradigm shift in order to meet 
these increasing requirements and support hundreds of 
thousands of simultaneous connections for smartphones, 
wearable devices, smart vehicles, etc. 
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Despite a significant amount of research conducted on 
vehicular networks, e.g., [6-9], they have not yet been realised 
or deployed on a large scale worldwide. The lack of 
scalability, high mobility support, latency requirements, and 
security and privacy issues are few examples of the difficulties 
facing a successful deployment of vehicular networks. Recent 
studies on the performance evaluation of both IEEE 802.11p 
and LTE standards, which are proposed for vehicular 
networking, show a lack of scalability and limited mobility 
support, in the case of IEEE 802.11p, while LTE standards 
struggle to obtain stringent delay requirements in the presence 
of high cellular network traffic [10-12]. With massive 
bandwidths, reduced latency and lowered cost, 5G enabled 
vehicular networks are a promising solution to empower the 
real-time services offered by vehicular communications 
especially in highly dense populated urban areas. 
In order to address the challenging requirements facing the 
ambitious goals of 5G cellular networks, recent research and 
industry studies suggest that a potential multi-tier and 
heterogeneous network architecture along with the 
aggregation of the following three key radio technologies: 
millimetre wave (mmWave), ultra-densification of small cells, 
and massive multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO), could 
help to achieve 5G goals [13, 4]. In addition to these ‘big 
three’ technologies, cloud-based networking, Software 
Defined Networking (SDN), Network Function Virtualisation 
(NFV), and Device-to-Device (D2D) communications are also 
expected to take place at the network level in 5G cellular 
networks. These network technologies may play a crucial role 
in facilitating the application of some of the aforementioned 
‘big three’ technologies. For instance, in mmWave 
communications, link outages occur when obstacles such as 
buildings and freight vehicles block Line-Of-Sight (LOS) 
connection. In this case, D2D communications can maintain 
links between the communicating devices and mmWave base 
stations when LOS links are not available. 
While the integration of the above-mentioned radio and 
network technologies can bring 5G cellular networks to 
fruition, a variety of security and privacy issues are imposed 
and thus should be carefully addressed. Methods of achieving 
security requirements such as identity protection and data 
integrity need to be revisited because of the expected 
heterogeneous network architecture in 5G networks. 
Concerning vehicular networks, although novel real-time 
applications can be realised using the futuristic 5G cellular 
network architecture, it should be considered that the 
generated data may be private and sensitive and yet relayed 
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through different network entities such as vehicles and small 
cells and/or storage in the cloud. This calls for an innovative 
design of secure and privacy-aware protocols for the potential 
real-time services in 5G enabled vehicular networks. 
In this paper, we present a novel system model for 5G 
enabled vehicular networks that facilitates a secure and 
privacy-aware real-time video reporting service. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study that envisages the 
architecture of 5G enabled vehicular network and addresses 
the security and privacy challenges of real-time video 
reporting services in such networks. The proposed service 
allows the participating vehicles to securely transmit videos of 
traffic accidents to the nearest designated official vehicle, e.g., 
police or ambulance, over 5G communication links. The 
ultimate objective of this reporting service is to facilitate a 
timely response toward traffic accidents, which will lead to 
substantial improvements in road safety and potentially save 
more lives. 
In order to gain people’s attention and incentivise 
authorities to implement such a collaborative reporting service 
on the roads, a set of security and privacy requirements should 
be carefully addressed in the proposed 5G enabled vehicular 
networks system. The sender has to be provided with strong 
security and privacy guarantees against any attempt to trace 
the reported accident video via eavesdropping on the wireless 
communications or attacks on the small cells or hacking into 
the cloud. On the other hand, authorities and official vehicles 
should be able to confirm the authenticity of the reported 
video without revealing the identity of the sender. If the 
reported video looks suspicious or there is a legal need for 
authorities to identify the sender as a witness, who provided 
his/her consent for witnessing, cooperation among different 
authorities should commence to reveal the sender’s identity. 
Given the expected heterogeneous architecture of 5G 
enabled vehicular networks, the conflicting objectives of 
privacy and traceability, as well as the challenges of designing 
secure protocols for real-time services, we are motivated to 
design a novel secure and privacy-aware protocol that can 
effectively address these challenges. The new contributions of 
this paper are three folds. 
 First, we propose a novel system model for 5G enabled 
vehicular networks. The proposed model shows the 
interactions among different radio and network 
technologies expected to be employed in 5G networks. 
Moreover, it highlights the security and privacy issues that 
emerge from the utilised 5G technologies in the context of 
5G enabled vehicular networks. 
 Secondly, we develop a secure and privacy-aware 
protocol that delivers a trusted and reliable real-time video 
reporting service in 5G enabled vehicular networks. The 
novelty of our proposed protocol lies in its unique design 
that targets the emerged security and privacy issues that 
will face the reporting service because of the small cells, 
D2D communications, and cloud-based networking in 5G 
networks. It incorporates a novel set of authentication and 
encryption schemes that is carefully designed to provide 
the security and privacy levels required for such a service. 
At the same time, the proposed protocol aims to minimise 
the overhead of these schemes and achieves the 
performance balance required to accommodate the real-
time nature of the video reporting service. 
 Finally, we design a secure and privacy-preserving 
registration scheme for the proposed reporting service that 
guarantees a distributed identity resolution of the 
participating vehicles. Furthermore, it ensures that 
insufficient corrupted authorities do not have the power to 
illegally reveal the identity of an innocent video sender. 
Furthermore, the developed protocol can be extended and 
utilised by traffic management authorities to monitor the road 
conditions and nearby environments. The authorities can make 
use of a huge number of mobile and fixed cameras to collect 
real-time information for more efficient and effective 
management of roads. In this way, video reports could be sent 
upon request from authorities even if there is no traffic 
accident. However, in this paper, our focus is on promoting a 
secure and safe collaborative approach between vehicles on 
one-hand and traffic authorities on the other hand to deal with 
traffic accidents effectively. This collaborative service benefits 
from the attractive features that 5G cellular networks are 
expected to offer while addressing the security and privacy 
requirements of the participants. Thus, our work aims to take 
part in improving road safety and reducing the number of 
causalities that are caused by late response toward traffic 
accidents. We evaluate the proposed protocol through a 
comprehensive analysis to check its fulfilment and feasibility 
in terms of security, privacy and efficiency. 
Although we choose the 5G technology to serve as a basic 
infrastructure to facilitate the proposed service, 4G LTE 
technology can be also utilised. However, besides the stringent 
delay requirements that have a great impact on preventing 
internal adversaries from tracking a particular vehicle while 
transmitting the accident video, as explained later in Section 
VI-A, 4G LTE networks do not offer the security requirements 
that can strengthen the application of the proposed service. 
User data integrity, accountability and non-repudiation for 
service requests, and protection against active International 
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catching attacks are some 
examples of security requirements that are not offered by 4G 
LTE. These features are of great importance to improve the 
security and privacy aspects of the proposed reporting service 
and are foreseen to be addressed in 5G networks [14, 15]. 
Moreover, 5G is expected to offer users’ applications the 
flexibility regarding their required security and privacy 
features. This flexibility means that a specific security and 
privacy policy, which is designed to protect the participating 
vehicles identities, can be applied in the proposed reporting 
service in 5G enabled vehicular networks. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section II 
overviews the state of the art of the subject area. Section III 
presents the preliminaries that are relevant to this work. 
Section IV introduces the system model of 5G enabled 
vehicular networks. Section V presents the proposed secure 
and privacy-aware protocol. Security, privacy, and efficiency 
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analysis of the developed protocol is provided in Section VI. 
Finally, Section VII concludes the paper. 
II. STATE OF THE ART 
In order to guarantee a successful deployment and 
acceptance of the video reporting service in real-world 
scenarios, a set of security and privacy requirements such as 
authentication, non-repudiation, anonymity, as well as 
traceability should be met in accordance with the expected 
characteristics of the 5G network architecture. To the best of 
our knowledge, there are no previous studies that address 
these security requirements in the context of the futuristic 5G 
enabled vehicular networks. The security and privacy issues of 
5G cellular networks and user privacy and anonymous 
communications in vehicular networks were studied 
separately. Next, we give a brief review of some related work. 
In the context of security and privacy issues of 5G cellular 
networks, most studies focus on assessing the security 
challenges of individual technologies that are expected to 
coexist in 5G cellular networks where each one, e.g., SDN or 
NFV, has its own security challenges and requirements. 
Mantas et al. [16] presented some representative examples of 
potential threats and attacks against the main components of 
5G cellular networks. These examples were derived from the 
threats and attacks against the 3G and 4G mobile systems to 
highlight the future security issues in the upcoming 5G 
networks. The authors classified four attractive targets in the 
5G network: User Equipment (UE), access networks, the 
mobile operator’s core network and external IP networks. UE 
location tracking, message insertion attacks, physical 
tampering with Home eNode B (HeNB) femtocells, and 
eavesdropping on user data are few examples of the potential 
attack vectors that may face 5G networks’ components. 
In [17], the authors discussed the physical layer security for 
each of the ‘big three’ technologies proposed for 5G networks. 
Unlike the traditional approach, which protects data security 
through cryptographic techniques, physical layer security is 
identified as a promising strategy that provides secure wireless 
transmissions by smartly exploiting the imperfections of the 
communications medium. In this way, the quality of signal 
reception at unauthorised receivers can be effectively 
degraded, thus preventing them from acquiring confidential 
information from the received signal. The physical layer 
security does not depend on computational complexity and has 
high scalability that makes it an attractive option considering 
the different powers and computation capabilities of the 
connected devices in the 5G network. The authors proposed 
different physical layer security solutions for each of the 5G 
technologies, e.g., artificial noise, antenna correlation and 
confidential broadcasting. 
Alam et al. [18] proposed a security architecture to analyse 
security requirements for three types of D2D communications 
in LTE-A networks. They classified the use cases and 
scenarios of D2D communications, which are proposed in [19, 
20], into three scenarios: 1) Network-covered D2D without 
user applications, where all devices in proximity are covered 
by a LTE-A network and user applications do not require D2D 
communications. This type is used for traffic offload purposes; 
2) Network-covered D2D with user applications, where all 
devices in proximity are covered by a LTE-A network and 
user applications do require D2D communications. This type 
is used for social networking applications; and 3) Network-
absent D2D for public safety, where at least one device in 
proximity is not covered by a LTE-A network. This type is 
used for disaster rescue. The authors defined the following 
four security attacks against the direct radio link in D2D 
communication: eavesdropping, impersonation attack, attack 
on traffic data and attack on control data. Based on the 
existing network security access functions and algorithms in 
LTE-A, the authors proposed authentication, key agreement, 
encryption and integrity procedures to protect the D2D 
communications in the aforementioned three scenarios. 
In the context of vehicular networks, a handful of research 
work focuses on privacy-preserving and anonymous 
communications, e.g., [21-25]. Sun et al. [26] proposed an 
identity-based security system for user privacy in Vehicular 
Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) using pseudonym-based and 
group-signature-based authentication schemes to satisfy the 
security requirements of authentication, non-repudiation, 
message integrity and confidentiality while achieving privacy 
desired by vehicles and accountability required by authorities. 
The security system is proposed for safety messages broadcast 
where vehicles obtain a set of short-lived pseudonyms and 
renew them later via communications with the road side units 
(RSUs). The authors designed a threshold signature-based 
scheme to prevent corrupted or compromised authorities to 
frame an innocent vehicle. When a misbehaving vehicle is 
detected, all its pseudonyms will be revoked. This method 
results in a large certification revocation list (CRL) and all 
other vehicles within the same access group should update 
their information, which also results in high checking and 
updating overhead. Furthermore, if the RSU is compromised, 
the adversary will be able to link the issued pseudonymous 
certificates with the real identity of the targeted vehicle. 
In [27], the authors proposed a collaborative protocol for 
enforcing anonymity in VANETs inspired by the well-known 
Crowds protocol [28] where each user probabilistically 
decides to send a message directly to a common receiver, or 
else to forward it to a peer, who is asked to repeat the process. 
The aim of the proposed protocol is to allow users to report 
traffic infractions where neither the infrastructure point nor the 
users participating in the protocol can compromise the 
anonymity of reporting users. When an accident occurs, the 
participating vehicle generates a message m that contains the 
description, location and time of the accident, encrypts m 
using the public key of the infrastructure point, and forwards it 
to a chosen neighbour. The message is then forwarded 
randomly until reaching its destination. The infrastructure 
point decrypts the received message and generates a hash h(m) 
that is incorporated into a list of encrypted traffic offenses. 
This list is then made available to users to allow them to check 
whether their messages have been received or not. The main 
limitation of this protocol is the unconditional privacy, 
resulting in the traceability requirement unattainable. In this 
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TABLE I – NOTATIONS 
5G_ID A unique 5G identity for each vehicle  
TA Trusted Authority 
E An arbitrary entity 
AS A set of attributes  
CertTA,E Public key certificate of entity E issued by TA 
dkAS Decryption key associated with the set of attributes AS 
dlv The distance travelled by a vehicle Cv without changing 
its velocity and lane 
DVi The official designated vehicle i 
TVr The reported traffic accident video 
EncC The encrypted data of TVr 
I The secret information  
Ψi The secret share i 
ITHSΨi (m) The individual threshold signature on message m using 
the secret share Ψi 
ITHV(ITHSΨi) The individual threshold signature verification of ITHSΨi 
kw A set of multiple keywords  
PKR/SKR The public/private keys of the recipient R  
PCertTA,5G_ID,j A pseudonymous certificate of a vehicle, which is 
associated with 5G_ID, issued by TA for a period j  
PCertTA,Cv,j A pseudonymous certificate of a vehicle Cv issued by TA 
for a period j 
PK5G_ID,j 
/SK5G_ID,j 
The public/private keys of a vehicle, which is associated 
with 5G_ID, for a period j 
PKCv,j/SKCv,j The public/private keys of a vehicle Cv for a period j 
PIDCv,j The pseudo identity of a vehicle Cv for a period j 
VPCv,j The validity period of pseudonymous certificate of 
vehicle Cv for a period j 
σTA,Cv,j
 
The digital signature of TA on the pseudonymous 
certificate of vehicle Cv for a period j 
SKTA The private key of TA for the purpose of signing the 
issued pseudonymous certificates 
RCv The communication range of a vehicle Cv 
SH1, SH2 Two random hash seeds used to generate the 
pseudonymous certificate  
THS(m) The threshold signature on a message m 
THV(THS) The threshold signature verification performed by the TA  
Tkw A trapdoor token associated with keyword kw 
ΔT The validity period threshold of a pseudonymous 
certificate 
κi The secret key generated by Ei for the threshold signature 
scheme 
σ5G_ID,j The digital signature of a vehicle, which is associated with 
5G_ID, for a period j 
U The tag required to upload the video file to the cloud 
PKABE /MKABE The public/master keys for CP-ABE algorithm  
 
 
 
way, users can easily deceive the authorities and generate fake 
traffic incident reports or even frame innocent vehicles. 
Finally, Hu et al. [29] proposed ATCS, an anonymous and 
traceable communication scheme for VANETs that aim to 
provide anonymity, traceability and authenticity of signed 
broadcasting messages to prevent internal attacks. The ATCS 
is based on the efficient combination of the endorsing scheme 
using a group-based (t, n) threshold signature [30] and an 
anonymous signature scheme using Weil Pairing [31]. The 
anonymous signature scheme provides traceability in 
broadcast but cannot distinguish fake messages that might be 
generated by internal attackers. On the other hand, the 
endorsing scheme makes it possible to prevent internal attacks 
because each generated safety message m from vehicle Cv is 
endorsed, i.e., authenticated, by other vehicles by generating 
their individual signatures of m if it is found to convey real 
information. After receiving enough individual signatures of m 
from other vehicles, Cv generates the integrated signature of m 
and broadcasts it. This scheme results in high signatures 
overhead because many vehicles should verify each 
broadcasted message before generating the final signature on 
m and broadcasting it. 
Following the above discussion, it can be noticed that the 
proposed solutions for privacy and anonymous 
communications in VANETs focused on safety broadcast 
messages and assumed homogenous network architecture. Due 
to the nature of safety messages, their contents are meant to be 
seen by every entity that receives them. Moreover, they are 
periodically broadcasted to convey current information, so 
there is no benefit of storing these messages for use later. 
Consequently, the privacy of the messages’ contents and the 
untrusted storage issue have not been considered or discussed 
in the current literature. Therefore, we can argue that no direct 
work has been conducted to design a secure, privacy-aware 
and efficient video reporting service in heterogeneous network 
architecture such as 5G enabled vehicular networks, which is 
the subject of this paper. 
III. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we introduce the cryptographic mechanisms 
and schemes that are utilised as building blocks in our 
proposed protocol. The main notations used throughout this 
paper are given in Table I. 
A. Pseudonymous Authentication Scheme 
Let (𝔾1, +) and (𝔾2, ∙) be two cyclic groups of prime order q 
and e : 𝔾1 ×  𝔾1 → 𝔾2 be an efficient admissible bilinear map. 
A trusted authority (TA) chooses a random generator P ∈ 𝔾1, 
two one-way hash functions h(∙), e.g., SHA-512, and f(∙) : {0, 
1}* → 𝔾1 and a random master key s ∈ ℤ𝑞
∗ . The TA then sets 
Ppub = sP as its public key and publishes the system 
parameters (𝔾1, 𝔾2, q, P, e, Ppub, h(∙), f(∙), SEnc(∙), ΔT) where 
SEnc(∙) is a secure symmetric encryption algorithm and ΔT is 
the validity period threshold of an issued pseudonymous 
certificate. In this paper, we adopt the pseudonymous 
authentication scheme with strong privacy preservation 
(PASS) [32]. The TA generates a private key SKTA for the 
purpose of signing an issued pseudonymous certificates 
PCertTA,Cv,j that belongs to vehicle Cv for a validity period j. 
The issued certificate contains the public key PKCv,j of Cv (21 
bytes), its pseudo identity PIDCv,j (20 bytes), the certificate 
validity period VPCv,j (4 bytes), and the digital signature σTA,Cv,j 
of the TA on this certificate (21 bytes). Hence, the total size of 
PCertTA,Cv,j is 66 bytes. Cv can have multiple such certificates. 
The TA generates the pseudo identities (PIDs) of Cv based 
on a one-way hash-chain technology. Each certificate 
PCertTA,Cv,j is calculated based on two hash chains with two 
random hash seeds SH1 and SH2. Therefore, releasing SH1 and 
SH2 can revoke all the pseudonymous certificates of Cv and 
reveal the linkability among these certificates. In this way, the 
CRL size will be linear with the number of revoked vehicles 
and unrelated to the number of pseudonymous certificates the 
revoked vehicle held. Upon the receipt of SH1 and SH2, each 
entity E in the system can calculate all PIDs of the 
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pseudonymous certificates held by the revoked vehicle and 
drop the messages signed by these certificates. As explained 
later in Section V-A, the number of pseudonymous certificates 
each vehicle acquires for the proposed video reporting service 
is relatively small. Therefore, the calculated certificates can be 
stored in E to drop any message that is signed by the revoked 
vehicle. Finally, the TA securely delivers the private key set 
{SKCv,j} and the pseudonymous certificate set {PCertTA,Cv,j} to 
Cv and stores the mapping relationship between the real 
identity of Cv, its PIDs and the corresponding SH1 and SH2. 
The reason that we adopt the PASS scheme in our work is 
that unlike other pseudonymous authentication schemes such 
as BP [21], PASS optimises the CRL size to be linear with the 
number of revoked vehicles as explained above. For instance, 
43,800 pseudonymous certificates are added to the CRL when 
one vehicle is revoked in the BP scheme [21]. Moreover, the 
PASS scheme achieves the lowest certificate verification 
overhead in comparison to other schemes such as the Efficient 
Conditional Privacy Preservation (ECPP) protocol [33] and 
Hybrid scheme [34] as explained later in Section VI-B. 
We assume that the TA is trusted by all entities and the 
mapping tables are strongly protected. However, if the TA is 
compromised, the privacy is compromised as well. One way to 
avoid this scenario is to distribute the TA’s responsibilities 
among multiple TAs for joint certificate issuing and 
management in such a way that no less than a set number of 
the TAs can jointly reveal the link between a pseudonym and 
its associated real identity. The design of such a TA role 
sharing solution is beyond the scope of this paper. 
B. Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search 
The public key encryption with a keyword search (PEKS) 
mechanism allows an entity E to outsource the storage of its 
encrypted data to another entity, e.g., a storage server in the 
cloud, while maintaining the ability to search encrypted 
keywords, which are associated with the encrypted data, 
without compromising the security of the original data [35, 
36]. The entity E starts by generating a searchable encryption 
SPEKS of a set of multiple keywords kw = {kw1, kw2 … kwz} as 
follows SPEKS ← PEKS(PKR, kw) where PKR is the public key 
of a recipient R. It then uploads SPEKS along with the encrypted 
data to the storage server. In order to search for the encrypted 
data on the storage server, R generates a trapdoor Tkwi that is 
associated with the keyword kwi using his private key SKR as 
follows Tkwi ← Trapdoor(SKR, kwi) and sends it to the storage 
server. The received trapdoor Tkwi authorises a search process 
on the storage server where a test function Test(SPEKS, Tkwi) is 
run on stored SPEKS and returns true if kwi ∈ kw. Following, the 
ciphertext associated with the keyword kwi is returned to R for 
decryption. 
C. Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption 
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-based Encryption (CP-ABE) is 
an asymmetric encryption technique to realise complex access 
control on encrypted data on a storage server and keep the data 
confidential even if the storage server is untrusted [37]. Let us 
assume the universe of attributes is defined to be {‘police 
vehicle’, ‘ambulance’, ‘traffic authority’, ‘traffic law 
enforcement’}. Upon system initialisation, the TA issues a 
public key PKABE and a master key MKABE. The MKABE is 
utilised to produce a decryption key dkAS for an entity E that is 
associated with a set of attributes, AS, that describes E, e.g., 
AS = {‘police vehicle’, ‘traffic authority’, ‘traffic law 
enforcement’}. In order to give E an access to the encrypted 
data, it should be encrypted using a specific policy Policy, 
e.g., Policy = {‘police vehicle’ OR ‘traffic authority’}, as 
ABEC ← ABE.Enc(PKABE, data, Policy). Thus, E can access 
the encrypted data and decrypts it as follows data ← 
ABE.Dec(ABEC, dkAS). In this way, other entities such as E` 
cannot access the encrypted data unless the set of attributes, 
AS`, for its decryption key dkAS` satisfies the specified policy 
Policy. If yes, it can also apply data ← ABE.Dec(ABEC, dkAS`). 
D. Threshold Schemes based on Secret Sharing 
The threshold schemes are utilised to distribute secret 
information, e.g., a secret key, to multiple entities to eliminate 
power centralisation and a single point of failure [26]. Let I be 
the secret information that can be divided into d pieces I1… Id 
where the knowledge of any number kp or more of these 
pieces can recover I while the knowledge of (kp – 1) pieces or 
less keeps I completely undetermined [38]. These schemes are 
usually referred to as a (kp, d) threshold scheme, which is 
computed based on polynomial interpolation. 
IV. 5G ENABLED VEHICULAR NETWORKS SYSTEM MODEL 
In this section, we propose a system model for 5G enabled 
vehicular networks. Afterwards, we define the security 
requirements that should be fulfilled to facilitate a successful 
deployment of the proposed video reporting service. 
A. System Model 
Fig. 1 shows the proposed multi-tier 5G enabled vehicular 
network composed of HetNets, D2D communications, a cloud 
platform, Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), TA, Law 
Enforcement Agency (LEA), as well as vehicles with 5G 
cellular connectivity. In the following, we briefly discuss the 
system components in Fig. 1 and explain their roles in the 5G 
enabled vehicular networks. 
1) Heterogeneous Networks (HetNets) 
In order to meet the increasing demands of higher data rates 
and raise the network capacity in 5G, two solutions have 
emerged: 1) reduce the size of cells; and 2) move toward the 
mmWave spectrum. By reducing the size of the cell, area 
spectral efficiency is increased through higher frequency 
reuse, while the number of users competing for resources at 
each base station (BS) decreases [39]. The ultra-densification 
of small cells leads to a higher number of connected devices 
and higher mobile data rates. Nonetheless, much more 
bandwidth is still needed. The mmWave communications can 
provide very high data rates since it operates over a vast 
amount of spectrum in the range of 30-300 GHz where 
wavelengths are 1-10 mm. Thus, densifying mmWave cells 
can produce huge gains and form backhauling for 5G cellular 
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networks. However, mmWave communications are not yet 
ready to be used in mobile communications since it suffers 
from a tremendous propagation loss and may be blocked by 
obstacles, as they require establishing LOS communications. 
These technical challenges are still under investigation and it 
is expected to be resolved before 2020 [40]. 
 
Fig. 1. 5G Enabled Vehicular Network – A multi-tier network model composed of macrocells, picocells, femtocells and D2D links 
In Fig. 1, it is assumed that mmWave small cells provide 
data transmission over short-range mmWave links while a 
microwave BS, i.e., a macrocell, provides control signals in 
microwave frequencies to ensure that control links are still in 
place. This approach is called ‘soft cells’ within the 3GPP 
standard [41, 42]. This means that vehicles should support 
associations with multiple radio access technologies that 
include not only 5G connectivity at mmWave frequencies but 
also 3G, 4G LTE, Wi-Fi, IEEE 802.11p and direct D2D 
communications. Choosing an appropriate standard and the 
right spectrum to utilise will be a complicated task in such a 
network [13]. This issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Besides the aforementioned small cells, a special type called 
Mobile femtocell (MFemtocell) is expected to be located 
within vehicles to communicate with drivers and passengers 
[43]. MFemtocell combines the mobile relay concept with the 
femtocell technology to accommodate high mobility users 
within public transport, e.g., trains and buses, and private 
vehicles. In this way, users within vehicles receive high data 
rate services with reduced signalling overhead [44]. 
2) D2D Communications 
Given the limitations of mmWave communications, D2D 
communication is an essential technology to support the 5G 
enabled vehicular network. D2D communication allows two 
nearby devices to communicate with each other in the licensed 
cellular bandwidth without a BS involved or with limited BS 
involvement [45]. D2D communication is currently considered 
as a part of 4G LTE-A standards in the 3GPP Release 12. In 
Fig. 1, vehicles can connect to the 5G cellular network via 
direct links with the mmWave small cells or by relay via other 
devices using D2D communication when LOS 
communications are not available. Besides that, D2D 
communication can be used to provide wireless connection 
between two small cells with a high data rate forming a part of 
the 5G backhaul where fibre links between them are not 
available. In Fig. 1, we assume that D2D communication is 
maintained with or without the BS control. 
3) Cloud Platform 
In Fig. 1, the cloud platform offers the capabilities of 
storing and accessing data from anywhere. This includes the 
reported videos of traffic accidents in our proposed service. 
The senders should transmit the reported videos to the cloud 
when a communication route to the recipient may not be 
available, i.e., the official vehicle is not reachable via multi-
hop communication. Therefore, moving the data to the cloud 
is essential to facilitate a quick notification and access to the 
recipient. In Fig. 1, we assume that a multipath reliable routing 
algorithm exists, e.g., [46], to find multiple reliable routes 
from the sender to the cloud to transmit the video file as soon 
as possible. Moreover, it is assumed that the recipient can 
access the cloud instantly via 5G communications links. 
Indeed, video flow processing could cause high loads on the 
servers that are processing and/or delivering the video data in 
the cloud. However, our proposed protocol only uses the cloud 
as a storage for receiving, storing and passing the video files 
to official vehicles. Thus, the cloud itself does not process the 
video files as they are encrypted. Although there are some 
emerging techniques for processing the encrypted files, they 
are resource demanding and inefficient. Nevertheless, to 
satisfy the high demands of 5G network users in general, it is 
assumed that the cloud platform implements specific solutions 
such as virtual video transcoding in the cloud [47] for higher-
performance and higher-density video processing. 
4) Trusted Authority (TA) 
The TA is assumed to be fully trusted by all parties in the 
5G enabled vehicular network system and in charge of 
registering the participating vehicles and conducting the 
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system initialisation. This includes the pseudonymous 
certificates generation, public/private key assignment, and 
creation of a database to store related information such as the 
pseudonym lookup tables. It is assumed that the TA is 
powered with sufficient storage capability, strongly protected 
and difficult for any adversary to compromise. Moreover, as 
explained later in Section V-B, we have devised a layer of role 
separation where the TA does not have the full mapping 
between the issued pseudonymous certificates and the real 
identity of the vehicle. This reduces trust reliance on the TA. 
5) Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) 
All vehicles are supposed to register with the DMV where 
periodical inspection usually takes place. Besides the 
conventional identifier of the vehicle, i.e., Electronic Licence 
Plate (ELP) or Electronic Chassis Number (ECN), each 
vehicle is assumed to have a 5G identifier (5G_ID), which is 
similar to the idea of a subscriber identification module (SIM) 
number in 3G and 4G systems. Therefore, each vehicle Cv 
registers with 2-tuple (Cv, 5G_ID) at the DMV. Furthermore, 
the DMV is assumed to be connected to a secure wired 
network where it can provide the TA with an updated list of 
the 5G identities of registered vehicles that have expressed 
their willingness to participate in the video reporting service. 
6) Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) 
Due to the sensitivity of the reported information, i.e., 
traffic accidents, LEAs are part of the proposed system 
because they should be able to trace misbehaving users that 
might report fabricated accident videos. However, this 
privilege should not be used to unnecessarily track innocent 
vehicles that reported genuine accidents in the first place. This 
is not only because of the possibility of resulting in the 
reporting vehicle being abused but also to make sure that the 
driver and/or passengers of the reporting vehicle will not be 
asked to come as witnesses in court unless they have given 
their consent to do so. Thus, LEAs cannot reveal the identity 
of the reporting vehicle unless they cooperate with the DMV 
and the TA to do that as explained later in Section V. 
B. Security Objectives 
It can be seen in Fig. 1 that the proposed system has 
different network components where each one has different 
security issues. In the following, we describe the security 
objectives that should be fulfilled to achieve a reliable, secure 
and privacy-aware video reporting service in the 5G enabled 
vehicular networks shown in Fig. 1. 
 Authentication. This requirement includes vehicle 
authentication and message integrity. Vehicle 
authentication enables the designated official vehicles and 
LEAs to check the authenticity of the sender, whereas 
message integrity ensures that the content of the reported 
video has not been altered in transit. All accepted video 
reports should come from the participating vehicles only 
and delivered unaltered. 
 Non-Repudiation. The participating vehicles should not be 
able to deny the video reports generated by themselves. 
Non-repudiation is very important due to the sensitivity 
and consequences of the reported accident videos. In this 
way, malicious users will not be able to deceive the 
system without being identified. 
 Conditional Anonymity and Privacy. Privacy is an 
essential requirement for the proposed reporting service to 
gain people’s acceptance and participation. A vehicle 
owner’s identity and location information are preserved 
against unlawful tracing and user profiling. However, the 
ability of revealing the identity of the reporting vehicle 
should be offered for the authorities only in special 
circumstances. In the proposed system shown in Fig. 1, 
the TA can partially reveal the real identity of a 
participating vehicle, whereas other entities could neither 
identify the real identity nor correlate the reported videos 
signed by the same sender in the long term. Using the 
pseudonymous authentication schemes, the conditional 
anonymity and privacy are held if the validity period of 
the pseudonymous certificate is less than a threshold ΔT. 
 Traceability. This feature is required to identify malicious 
users who could transmit fake accident video reports. For 
liability purposes, LEAs need to reveal the identity 
information of the misbehaving participants and revoke 
their credentials. This is done to prevent these participants 
from further disrupting or deceiving the authorities’ 
operations. Certain cooperation among different entities 
should take place for the purpose of tracing malicious 
and/or misbehaving participants as explained later in the 
protocol description in Section V. 
C. Adversary Model 
In the 5G enabled vehicular networks, we consider any 
component to be an adversary if it misbehaves or deviates 
from the legitimate operations required by the system. Due to 
the openness of wireless communications and the deployment 
of small cells in an unfenced environment, we take into 
account two kinds of adversaries: external and internal. The 
external adversary can capture the communications and 
analyse the transmitted packets between the communicating 
entities to learn about their identities, track their locations and 
learn about the contents of transmitted packets, i.e., the traffic 
accident video. On the other hand, the internal adversary is 
either one of the network entities that has been compromised 
by an attacker or a misbehaving user. In our threat model, we 
consider that small cells, vehicles, DMV, LEA and the cloud 
platform are compromisable and therefore can act as an 
internal adversary. The internal adversary shares the same 
goals as the external adversary in which he/she aims to 
observe other vehicles’ identities and locations and capture or 
alter the contents of the transmitted videos. In the following, 
we describe the main attacks that can be mounted by external 
and/or internal adversaries. 
 Eavesdropping. This attack can be mounted against the 
mmWave and/or D2D wireless communication links in 
Fig.1 by installing receivers on the road to eavesdrop the 
messages transmitted by vehicles. The aim of this attack is 
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to analyse the transmitted data packets to infer the source 
and recover the contents of the transmitted data packets. 
 Fabrication. The adversary can transmit a fabricated 
traffic accident video to deceive the authorities and affect 
the response of official vehicles and other users as well. 
This attack can be only mounted by internal adversary. As 
explained later in Section V, only the participants can 
upload the video files to the cloud after encrypting and 
signing these files. Thus, the external adversary cannot 
directly mount this attack. 
 Traffic analysis. This attack can be mounted by either an 
external or internal adversary with the aim of identifying 
the source of the transmitted packets and consequently 
tracking the vehicle that reported the traffic accident. This 
attack presents a major violation of the participating 
vehicles’ privacy.  
Other threats such as compromising the cloud storage, 
impersonation, and framing attacks can be also considered in 
our threat model. In the following sections, we explain how 
the proposed protocol can resist such threats in the context of 
the 5G enabled vehicular network shown in Fig. 1. 
V. SECURE AND PRIVACY-AWARE VIDEO REPORTING SERVICE 
PROTOCOL 
In this section, we develop the secure and privacy-aware 
video reporting service protocol in 5G enabled vehicular 
networks. In the following, we describe the operations of the 
proposed protocol in detail as shown in Fig. 2.  
A. System Initialisation  
In the proposed system, the TA is assumed to manage a 
certain regional area that could be a state or a city or a district. 
The TA chooses ΔT as the validity period threshold of the 
pseudonymous certificates that will be issued to each 
participating vehicle. Since these certificates will be only used 
for the purpose of reporting traffic accident videos, the TA 
estimates the number of pseudonymous certificates that a 
vehicle needs to acquire. We assume that each vehicle should 
have enough pseudonymous certificates for a whole year until 
the next vehicle’s inspection. Let us assume that Ar is the 
maximum number of traffic accidents the participating vehicle 
could report every day. In this way, the number of 
pseudonymous certificates for the whole year will be 365Ar 
certificates. If we assume that the participating vehicle might 
report two accidents per day, i.e., Ar = 2, then 730 
pseudonymous certificates will be needed for the whole year, 
which amounts to nearly 48 KB given that the certificate size 
is 66 bytes as illustrated before in Section III-A. Therefore, it 
is sufficient from a storage point of view to store this number 
of certificates in the participating vehicle.  
It is guaranteed that the issued pseudonymous certificates, 
which are stored in each participating vehicle, cannot be used 
to impersonate several vehicles in order to mount a Sybil 
attack because each certificate has a specific validity period 
and the number of certificates is relatively small. 
B. Participants and Official Vehicles Registration  
A new registration scheme is designed to allow a vehicle Cv 
to participate in the proposed service and be assured that no 
entity will be able to reveal its identity as long as the reported 
traffic accidents are authentic. The registration of the 
participants and official vehicles commences as follows. 
 Step 1. During the vehicles annual inspection, the user 
expresses its willingness to participate in the video 
reporting service. The participant vehicle registers its 2-
tuple (Cv, 5G_ID) with the DMV and includes a random 
symmetric key Sr ∈ ℤ𝑞
∗ , which is encrypted using the TA’s 
public key Ppub, expressed as PKE(Ppub, Sr). 
 Step 2. The DMV passes the registration request with the 
encrypted symmetric key to the TA requiring a set of 
pseudonymous certificates for the participating vehicle for 
the purpose of the reporting service. The DMV only sends 
the 5G_ID of the participating vehicle to the TA. The 
mapping between the vehicle real identity and its 5G_ID 
is kept at the DMV. This will offer a layer of role 
separation and more protection for the real identity of the 
participating vehicle as to be discussed later. It should be 
noticed that the 5G_ID is not necessarily fixed for a 
particular vehicle and can be changed during the next 
inspection/registration event. 
 Step 3. Based on the request received from the DMV, the 
TA issues a set of pseudonymous certificates 
{PCertTA,5G_ID,j}, a set of private keys {SK5G_ID,j}, a policy 
Policy = {‘police vehicle’ OR ‘ambulance’ OR ‘traffic 
law enforcement’ OR ‘traffic authority’}, and a tag U ∈
ℤ𝑞
∗ , which will be used by the participating vehicle to 
upload the reported video to the cloud. The tag U is a pre-
agreed value between the TA and the cloud platform and 
it is not unique to a participating vehicle. When the cloud 
receives a video file that is tagged with U, it saves the file 
and notifies the registrant official vehicles. In this way, 
the participating vehicles are not required to register with 
the cloud for the proposed reporting service. Finally, the 
TA encrypts all this information using the decrypted 
symmetric key Sr and sends them back to the DMV as 
SEnc(Sr, ({SK5G_ID,j}, {PCertTA,5G_ID,j}, PKABE, Policy, U)). 
Here, PKABE is the public key that will be used by the 
participant to encrypt a one-time encryption key Skey under 
Policy using CP-ABE as explained later in Step 12. 
 Step 4. The DMV forwards the encrypted information to 
the participating vehicle. 
In this way, the DMV knows the vehicle’s 5G_ID and its 
real identity but not its issued pseudonymous credentials. On 
the other hand, the TA knows the 5G_ID identity and the 
corresponding pseudonyms but not the real identity of the 
participating vehicle. Furthermore, only the participating 
vehicle can decrypt the received message in Step 4 and gets 
the set of pseudonymous credentials. Thus, this prevents 
external adversaries from mounting impersonation attacks by 
stealing the pseudonymous credentials of legitimate 
participating vehicle. 
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Finally, the received information is stored within a tamper-
proof device (TPD) that each participating vehicle is assumed 
to be equipped with to store the cryptographic information 
mentioned above. The TPD is a device that provides secure 
storage of cryptographic information and sensitive data as 
well as accelerating and securing cryptographic operations 
[48]. The implementation cost of the TPD is assumed to be 
the responsibility of the DMV. 
 
Fig. 2. The Proposed Secure and Privacy-aware Video Reporting Protocol 
 Steps 5, 6. The official vehicles should also register to be 
part of this service. This is necessary to ensure that only 
designated official vehicles will receive the notification of 
a reported traffic accident video. A designated official 
vehicle DVi sends a request to the TA via the LEA to 
register and gets a digital certificate and a decryption key. 
 Steps 7, 8. After verifying the request, the TA issues the 
certificate CertTA,DVi for DVi and uses the master key 
MKABE to produce a decryption key dkAS that is associated 
with the following set of attributes, AS = {‘police vehicle’, 
‘ambulance’, ‘traffic law enforcement’, ‘traffic 
authority’}. This information is then delivered to the 
DVi’s TPD via LEA. It should be noticed that the set of 
attributes in AS can be tuned based on the type of official 
vehicle, i.e., police or ambulance. In this work, we assume 
that all official vehicles should have an access to the 
traffic accident video. 
 Step 9. DVi uses the received information to register with 
the cloud platform to receive notifications when an 
encrypted traffic accident video file, which is tagged with 
U, is uploaded to the cloud storage. We assume that the 
registrant official vehicles would receive notifications that 
are related to the regional area managed by the TA in Fig. 
1. Distributing notifications from different regional areas 
that are under the management of different TAs is beyond 
the scope of this paper and is left for future work.  
It should be noticed that the registration process of 
participating vehicles is not performed in real-time. It takes 
place at the DMV at the annual inspection of vehicles or 
whenever a vehicle decides to participate. The same case is 
applied to the official vehicles at a specific LEA. 
Additionally, we assume that the registration process is 
performed over a secure wired network thus there is no need 
to encrypt the registration messages in Steps 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 
and 9 in Fig. 2. Otherwise, these messages can be protected 
using suitable encryptions methods. Note that Steps 5-9 are 
independent of Steps 1-4 although they are shown in the same 
figure with consecutive message numbers. This also applies 
to the other message groups in Fig. 2. 
At the end of the registration process, the TA chooses the 
signing key SKTA, which has been used to sign the issued 
pseudonymous certificates, to be distributed. It computes the 
SKTA’s shares Ψi where i = 1 … d and distributes these shares 
among d different entities, e.g., the DMV and multiple LEAs. 
Participating 
Vehicle 
DMV TA LEA 
Cloud 
Platform 
Official 
Vehicle 
register (Cv, 5G_ID, PKE(Ppub, Sr)) request (5G_ID, 
PKE(Ppub
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ABCC =ABE.Enc(PKABE, Skey, 
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σ5G_ID, j =Sign(SK5G_ID, j , h(EncC 
|| SPEKS || ABEC || h(U))) upload(EncC, SPEKS, ABEC, h(U), σ5G_ID, j , PCertTA,5G_ID, j) 
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Once a share Ψi is received, the corresponding entity 
generates a secret key κi that will be jointly utilised with Ψi to 
generate the partial threshold signature as explained later. 
C. Video Transmission  
 Step 10. When an accident occurs, the participating 
vehicle Cv acquires the recorded video file through its 
cameras and starts the video uploading process. First, it 
generates a one-time encryption/decryption key Skey for 
the symmetric encryption algorithm SEnc(∙) and uses it to 
encrypt the accident video report TVr as follows EncC ← 
SEnc(Skey, TVr) where EncC is the ciphertext of TVr. 
 Step 11. Cv uses PKR, the public key of the recipient R, to 
produce a searchable encryption of the keyword set kw = 
{“accident video report”, location, date and time} as 
follows SPEKS ← PEKS(PKR, kw). The set kw can be 
extended to include more keywords but it is advised to 
keep the number of keywords small to avoid delays that 
may occur in the search process. 
 Step 12. Cv utilises the CP-ABE to encrypt the one-time 
symmetric key Skey under Policy as follows ABEC ← 
ABE.Enc(PKABE, Skey, Policy). In this way, only the 
recipient with the decryption key that complies with 
Policy can decrypt ABEC and retrieve Skey. 
 Step 13. Using its selected pseudonymous certificate, Cv 
signs the tuple {EncC, SPEKS, ABEC, h(U)} as follows 
σ5G_ID, j = Sign(SK5G_ID,j , h(EncC || SPEKS || ABEC || h(U))), 
where SK5G_ID,j is the Cv’s private key associated with the 
selected certificate and ‘||’ denotes data concatenation. 
 Step 14. Cv uploads {EncC, SPEKS, ABEC, h(U), σ5G_ID,j, 
PCertTA,5G_ID,j} to the cloud platform over the 5G enabled 
vehicular network using the available communication 
links, i.e., mmWave and D2D communication links as 
shown in Fig. 1. It can be noticed that, besides the cloud 
platform and the TA, the tag U is only known to the 
participating vehicles. The adversaries cannot capture U 
by mounting eavesdropping and/or traffic analysis attacks 
since it is encrypted in Steps 3 and 4 and, based on the 
one-way property of hash functions, its value cannot be 
retrieved using h(U) in Step 14 or Step 15.  
D. Video Receipt/Retrieval 
 Step 15. Once the uploading process is done and the cloud 
platform verified the h(U) value, the notification service 
notifies the nearest designated vehicle DVi and sends it the 
following tuple {EncC, SPEKS, ABEC, h(U), σ5G_ID,j, 
PCertTA,5G_ID,j}. We assume that the location information 
of the official vehicles is updated periodically in the 
cloud. This assumption is valid since the location of an 
official vehicle DVi is not a secret at this stage. However, 
since the location information of police vehicles could be 
interesting to criminals, one possible solution is to let the 
cloud platform informs the police control centre that can 
then instruct relevant police vehicles to retrieve the data 
from the cloud. This solution however needs more 
investigation and is left for future work.  
 Step 16. DVi verifies the received certificate PCertTA,5G_ID,j 
as follows verify(Ppub, PCertTA,5G_ID,j, σTA,5G_ID,j). If 
PCertTA,5G_ID,j is proved to be valid, DVi extracts the public 
key PK5G_ID,j of the sender from the certificate.  
 Step 17. DVi verifies the received signature σ5G_ID,j as 
follows verify(PK5G_ID,j, h(EncC || SPEKS || ABEC || h(U)), 
σ5G_ID,j).  
 Step 18. If σ5G_ID,j is successfully verified, DVi uses its 
decryption key dkAS to decrypt the symmetric encryption 
key as follows Skey ← ABE.Dec(ABEC, dkAS). 
 Step 19. DVi uses Skey to decrypt the ciphertext and 
retrieve the traffic accident video file TVr as follows TVr 
← SDec(Skey, EncC). 
In our proposed protocol, the encrypted traffic accident 
videos stay on the cloud storage to be retrieved whenever they 
are needed. Later on, a designated recipient LEA who can 
search for the traffic accident videos on the cloud, i.e., the 
recipient R with the pair PKR/SKR, can retrieve the required 
videos as follows. 
 Step 20. LEA generates the searchable trapdoor token Tkwi 
as follows Tkwi ← Trapdoor(SKR, kwi), where keyword kwi 
can be a location, a date, or just “accident video report”.  
 Step 21. LEA sends this token Tkwi to the cloud platform, 
assuming that there is a secure channel between them. 
 Step 22. The receipt of Tkwi authorises the search process 
over the ciphertext at the cloud. 
 Step 23. LEA receives the corresponding tuple {EncC, 
SPEKS, ABEC, h(U), σ5G_ID,j, PCertTA,5G_ID,j} if the search 
was successful. Finally, LEA uses the same procedure 
mentioned above to retrieve the video file TVr. 
VI. SECURITY, PRIVACY AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS 
A. Security and Privacy Analysis 
1) Authentication and Non-Repudiation 
In the proposed service, the authentication and non-
repudiation are achieved by using a public key based digital 
signature that binds an encrypted traffic accident video to a 
pseudonym and consequently, to the real identity of the 
sender. As shown in Step 14 in Fig. 2, the sender attaches 
his/her pseudonymous certificate PCertTA,5G_ID,j to the 
uploaded file. PCertTA,5G_ID,j includes the sender’s public key 
and the TA’s signature as explained in Section III-A. In this 
way, the recipient can authenticate the sender by verifying its 
digital signature, to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the 
uploaded video file as shown via Steps 16 and 17 in Fig. 2. 
2) Conditional Anonymity and Privacy 
Our proposed protocol is resilient to traffic analysis attacks 
and achieves the conditional anonymity and privacy of the 
sender by using the pseudonymous authentication technique. 
As pointed out before, this technique conceals the real identity 
of the sender and makes it infeasible for other network entities 
and/or adversaries to identify the sender of a specific message. 
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Therefore, even if the cloud platform is compromised, the 
adversary will not be able to reveal the identity of the sender 
by looking at PCertTA,5G_ID,j unless the adversary has access to 
the mapping information of PCertTA,5G_ID,j and SH1 and SH2 
used to generate the pseudo identities of this sender at the TA.  
In addition, the sender Cv is required to use a different 
pseudonymous certificate for each new reported traffic 
accident video. Note that these pseudonymous certificates are 
only used for this reporting service, while for broadcasting 
safety or other messages, Cv should use different certificates. 
Thus, it is infeasible to track Cv by correlating the public keys 
it utilised. Let us assume the following scenario where an 
internal adversary controls at least two small cells separated 
by a distance dsc and is able to capture all the data packets of a 
transmitted video file from Cv. The adversary can correlate 
two utilised public keys if Cv is driving at constant velocity 
VCv in the same direction on the same lane for duration Tst 
between the two compromised small cells.  
Let the vehicle transmission range be RCv = 500 m, its 
constant velocity VCv = 100 km/h, Tst = 25 seconds, the size of 
TVr is 2GB, and distance dlv within which Cv does not change 
its velocity or lane. Cv can avoid being tracked if it finishes 
transmitting the video file TVr using the same key before 
travelling a distance equal to (2RCv + dlv) between the two 
observation points. After Tst = 25s, Cv travels dlv = 695 m with 
VCv = 100 km/h. According to the latest connection speed tests 
for 5G wireless technologies, an uninterrupted stable 
connection of 1.2 Gbps in a vehicle travelling at 100 km/h is 
achieved [49]. In this case, the time needed to transmit TVr is 
approximately 13.3s where Cv would have travelled 
approximately 370 m during this time without changing its 
velocity or lane. With the transmission range RCv = 500m, we 
can easily find that 370 < (2×500 + 695), i.e., Cv cannot be 
tracked in this scenario. If dsc > (2RCv + dlv), Cv can avoid 
being tracked by changing the utilised key before travelling a 
distance equal to or longer than dsc. Usually, in a traffic 
accident scene, vehicles would move slowly or even stop, 
particularly inside a city. Therefore, it will be guaranteed that 
the participating vehicle will finish transmitting the traffic 
accident video before travelling between the two observation 
points. Moreover, it is hard for the adversary to recognise the 
participating vehicle since many vehicles exist at the traffic 
accident scene.  
It can be concluded from the above discussion that the high 
connection speeds and the low latency provided by the 5G 
enabled vehicular network have a great impact on preventing 
internal adversaries from linking different videos transmission 
to a particular vehicle and consequently revealing its identity. 
It is infeasible for the adversary to track the sender since the 
time needed to transmit the video file is very short. Therefore, 
the sender does not need to change its certificate while 
transmitting the same video file. Finally, it can be noticed 
from Fig. 2 that the DMV does not access the cloud platform. 
Thus, it cannot know who is reporting and how many videos a 
particular participating vehicle has reported. 
3) Traceability 
The traceability is an essential requirement for the reporting 
service to ensure that internal adversaries can be identified 
when a fabrication attack is mounted. In Fig. 2, it can be 
noticed that all entities, except the TA, cannot reveal the 
relationship between the utilised pseudonymous certificate and 
the 5G_ID identity of the sender without the knowledge of the 
mapping information, which is kept in the pseudonym lookup 
tables at the TA, which is assumed to be strongly protected.  
When the authorities need to identify the sender of a 
particular traffic accident video file, the following steps should 
take place. We recall that the TA has distributed his private 
signing key SKTA among d entities, i.e., authorities, in the 
system at the end of the participant and official vehicle 
registration phase. First, the authority that initiates the tracing 
process should extract the pseudonymous certificate, i.e., 
PCertTA,5G_ID,j, which is associated with the suspicious 
encrypted video file. After that, cooperation between kp 
authorities commences as follows according to the literature in 
[50]. Each authority generates a partial threshold signature PSi 
= ITHSΨi(Ψi, κi, PCertTA,5G_ID,j) on PCertTA,5G_ID,j with key 
share Ψi and secret key κi. Then, PSi is sent to other (kp – 1) 
authorities for verification using ITHV(PCertTA,5G_ID,j, PSi). 
When kp valid signatures are gathered, any participating 
authority can calculate the threshold signature TS = THS(PSi, 
PCertTA,5G_ID,j) and sends it to the TA that verifies the received 
threshold signature THV(TS, PCertTA,5G_ID,j). If the verification 
is successful, the TA releases the two associated hash seeds 
SH1 and SH2 in the system to revoke all the pseudonyms 
certificates of the vehicle 5G_ID concerned, and reveals its 
identity 5G_ID from the pseudonym lookup table. Finally, the 
TA sends the 5G_ID to the DMV to obtain the real identity of 
the sender’s vehicle. 
Thus, it is guaranteed that insufficient corrupted authorities 
that illegally try to reveal the identity of an innocent sender do 
not have the power to conduct such an action. It is guaranteed 
that cooperation among an approved number of different 
authorities including the TA should take place to do that. 
B. Efficiency Analysis 
In this section, we analyse the efficiency of our proposed 
protocol in terms of encrypting, transmitting, retrieving and 
decrypting a traffic accident video file. All the benchmarks in 
this analysis were run on an Intel Core i7-2600 3.4 GHz 
processor using crypto++ library 5.6.2 [51]. The overhead of 
certificates updating and the storage of pseudonymous 
certificates and signing keys are not considered in our 
discussion because they are performed annually and offline 
during the vehicles’ inspection as explained before. We 
discuss the authentication overhead in terms of message 
signing and verification for different pseudonymous 
authentication methods that can be utilised in our service 
including the BP scheme, ECPP protocol, Hybrid scheme and 
the PASS scheme adopted in this paper. Furthermore, we 
discuss the performance of different symmetric encryption 
algorithms with different video file sizes and analyse the total 
time needed to encrypt, transmit and decrypt the reported 
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video file with different connection speeds that are expected in 
the near future in 5G enabled vehicular networks. 
1) Authentication Overhead 
Prior to verifying the message signature, the recipient 
should verify the sender’s certificate.  In order to do that, the 
recipient checks the CRL to see whether the sender’s 
certificate is revoked. If not, the recipient proceeds with the 
signature verification. If successful, the message will be 
accepted. The verification process of the sender’s certificate 
can be performed by the cloud and saves time on the recipient 
side. However, to deter the cloud from misbehaving or if it is 
compromised, the recipient can still randomly decide to 
perform this verification. Table II shows the costs of signing 
and verifying for the BP, ECPP, Hybrid, and PASS schemes 
where NCRL is the size of CRL [32]. It can be noticed from the 
results in Table II that the certificate verification process 
dominates the authentication overhead. Using the group-based 
signature mechanism in the Hybrid scheme results in high 
certificate verification overhead while the PASS and BP 
schemes have the lowest overhead since the TA directly signs 
the issued pseudonymous certificates. 
TABLE II – SIGNING AND VERIFICATION COSTS 
 Signing 
cost (ms) 
Certificate 
verification 
(ms) 
Signature 
verification 
(ms) 
Total (ms) 
PASS 0.6 1.2 1.2 3 
ECPP 0.6 14.7 1.2 16.5 
Hybrid 0.6 14.7+3.1NCRL 1.2 16.5+3.1NCRL 
BP 0.6 1.2 1.2 3 
2) Cryptographic Operations and Communication Overhead 
In our proposed service, the TA chooses the secure 
symmetric encryption/decryption SEnc(∙) algorithm. In the 
following, we analyse the performance of three common block 
cipher algorithms that can be chosen by the TA: AES/CBC 
(256-bit key), Twofish/CTR (256-bit key) and Serpent/CTR 
(256-bit key) where their processing speeds are 455 MB/s, 147 
MB/s and 65 MB/s, respectively. The video file size is variable 
and the utilised hash function is SHA-512 with a processing 
speed of 231 MB/s. The connection speed is 1.2 Gbps in the 
5G enabled vehicular network. Finally, we used the cpabe 
toolkit [52] and MIRACL [53] library to benchmark the 
performance of CP-ABE and PEKS algorithms, respectively. 
After capturing the video file TVr, the sender uses SEnc(∙) to 
encrypt it in Step 10. The time needed to perform the 
encryption operation SPEKS ← PEKS(PKR, kw) of the keyword 
set kw in Step 11 is approximately 36.52 ms. The encryption 
process ABEC ← ABE.Enc(PKABE, Skey, Policy) in Step 12 takes 
approximately 62 ms with Policy = {‘police vehicle’ OR 
‘ambulance’ OR ‘traffic law enforcement’ OR ‘traffic 
authority’}, which includes four attributes. Using SHA-512, 
the sender generates the hash value of the following items 
{EncC || SPEKS || ABEC || h(U)} and sign it in Step 13, where the 
signature generation takes approximately 0.6 ms. Fig. 3 shows 
the time overhead for encrypting and signing the captured 
video file of each examined algorithm. 
 
Fig. 3. Encryption/Signing Time Overhead 
Assuming an instant notification from the cloud platform to 
the nearest official vehicle, the retrieving process proceeds as 
follows. The recipient verifies the received message by 
performing the certificate verification in Step 16 and the 
sender’s signature verification in Step 17. From Table II, the 
certificate verification using the PASS scheme takes 1.2 ms 
while the message signature verification takes 1.2 ms. The 
recipient uses ABE.Dec(∙) to extract the symmetric decryption 
key Skey in Step 18, which takes approximately 18 ms. Then, it 
uses SDec(∙) to decrypt the received encrypted video file in 
Step 19. The resulted time overhead of verifying and 
decrypting the received video file for each examined 
algorithm is very similar to the results in Fig. 3. This is due to 
the fact of using symmetric cryptography and the similar 
performance of ABE.Dec(∙) and ABE.Enc(∙) functions. 
 
Fig. 4. Overall Time Overhead 
Finally, the estimated time to upload the encrypted traffic 
accident video file to the cloud or retrieve it from the cloud 
using 5G communication links is Tcomm = 13.3s as explained in 
Section VI-A. Note that we assume the same set of parameters 
for the recipient, i.e., its velocity is 100 km/h and the 5G link 
connection speed is 1.2 Gbps. Fig. 4 shows the overall time 
overhead from acquiring the captured traffic accident video 
file at the sender and receiving it at the recipient using our 
proposed protocol in Fig 2. The total time overhead includes 
the time needed to encrypt, sign, transmit, verify and decrypt 
the reported video file. 
To summarise, our proposed protocol can guarantee to 
report the traffic accident to the nearest designated official 
vehicle in less than one minute when the video file is 2GB and 
AES/CBC is utilised. Here, we assume that the sender is 
encrypting the traffic accident video file while capturing it, 
i.e., the encryption of the captured accident video will finish 
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immediately with a very little delay. Fig. 4 shows that our 
proposed real-time reporting service presents an excellent 
replacement of the offline methods that are currently used for 
the same purpose, e.g., [54], which could take days. Moreover, 
it is anticipated that the connection speeds for the 5G enabled 
vehicles will be higher than 1.2 Gbps as 1 Tbps speed has been 
achieved recently for stationary wireless connection [55]. To 
elaborate more on the effect of the expected connection speeds 
on this service, Fig. 5 shows the total time overhead of the 
proposed service with different connection speeds for the 5G 
cellular network with a 2GB accident video file. 
 
Fig. 5. Overall Time Overhead with Different 5G Connection Speeds 
It can be seen in Fig. 5 that the cryptographic operations 
overhead will be the main bottleneck for this service. 
Therefore, there are two possible solutions to improve the 
overall time overhead in Fig. 5. First, it is recommended to 
equip the vehicles with improved hardware to accelerate the 
cryptographic operations. Secondly, the cryptographic 
operations and the proposed protocol can be also improved to 
enhance the performance of the proposed service. With the 
arrival of 5G cellular networks, we expect the proposed 
service to have a noticeable impact on the society and promote 
timely response toward traffic accidents to reduce the number 
of causalities and potentially save more lives on the roads. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed a novel system model for a 5G 
enabled vehicular network that facilitates a secure and 
privacy-aware video reporting service. The ultimate objective 
of this service is to instantly report the videos of traffic 
accidents to the nearest official vehicle in order to improve 
safety on the roads. The proposed reporting service protocol is 
designed to take advantage of the expected features of 5G 
cellular networks in terms of high-speed connections, low 
latency and reduced cost. Moreover, it provides strong 
security and privacy against attacks that attempt to track a 
participating vehicle’s identity or reveal the contents of the 
reported accident video. The privacy of the participants is 
protected against internal and external adversaries that might 
compromise small cells, D2D communications relays or the 
cloud platform. Furthermore, the proposed protocol guarantees 
that insufficient corrupted authorities cannot reveal the 
identity of a participating vehicle and cooperation among an 
approved number of different authorities should take place to 
do that. Finally, we analysed the efficiency of the proposed 
service and showed that a traffic accident video can be 
reported in a secure and privacy-preserving way in less than 
one minute to the official vehicles to guarantee a quick 
response toward traffic accidents. 
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